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Abstract 
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smart-cards, Science of Computer Programming 21 (1993) 93-113. 
The authentication of users in distributed systems poses special problems because users lack the 
ability to encrypt and decrypt. The same problems arise when users wish to delegate some of their 
authority to nodes, after mutual authentication. 
In most systems today, the user is forced to trust the node he wants to use. In a more satisfactory 
design, the user carries a smart-card with sufficient computing power to assist him; the card provides 
encryption and decryption capabilities for authentication and delegation. 
Authentication is relatively straightforward with a powerful enough smart-card. However, for 
practical reasons, protocols that place few demands on smart-cards should be considered. These 
protocols are subtle, as they rely on fairly complex trust relations between the principals in the 
system (users, hosts, services). In this paper, we discuss a range of public-key smart-card protocols, 
and analyze their assumptions and the guarantees they offer. 
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1. Introduction 
In a secure distributed environment, there is a need for users to prove their identities 
to nodes, from mainframes to automatic teller machines. There is also a need, though 
less recognized, for nodes to prove their identities to users, as each user may trust 
different nodes to different extents. Furthermore, users must be able to delegate some 
of their authority to the nodes that they trust. 
Authentication protocols serve for these purposes, typically relying on secrets and 
encryption (e.g., [4,13,14]). The authentication of users poses special problems, 
because users lack the ability to encrypt and decrypt. 
In the simplest approach to user authentication, the user owns a secret (his password) 
that he gives to a node that he wishes to use. It is likely that the password will be short 
and memorable, or that the user will need to write it down. In either case, it may be 
easy for an attacker to discover the user’s password and hence obtain all his rights. 
This weakness can be eliminated by introducing a simple card with a small amount 
of read-only memory. Each user carries a card, and each card contains a different 
secret, which the node verifies before granting access to the user. The secret can be 
quite long, and hence hard to guess, but theft of the card is a significant danger. 
A further improvement consists in introducing a personal identification number 
(PIN), which the user types when he presents his card. Thus, theft of the card alone no 
longer suffices for a security breach. This scheme is essentially that used by most 
automated teller machines (ATMs). 
All of these approaches suffer from a serious flaw: the node must be completely 
trusted, as it obtains all of the user’s secrets. It is impossible for a user to delegate only 
part of his authority, or to delegate his authority for only a limited time. Moreover, 
a malicious node could remember the user’s secrets for future mischief. This threat 
seems important--consider, for example, the users of public terminals in hotels. 
A smart-card with sufficient computing power solves these problems. The smart- 
card we envision has its own keyboard, display, clock, logic for performing public-key 
encryption [7,15], and can be electrically coupled to the node. 
Authentication would be relatively straightforward with this powerful smart-card. 
The smart-card might operate only when fed a PIN, so an attacker would need to steal 
the smart-card and to discover the user’s PIN in order to impersonate the user. The 
keyboard and display allow the user to communicate directly with the smart-card, so 
that the node never sees the password. Since the smart-card performs public-key 
encryption, no secrets ever need be revealed to the node. 
After authentication, the smart-card can sign timestamped certificates to delegate 
part of the user’s authority for a limited time. For example, the smart-card could issue 
a certificate that allows the node to manipulate the user’s remote files for the next 
hour. The timestamp provides protection against replay attacks, and careful use of 
lifetimes can prevent mischief by the node at a later time. 
Unfortunately, no one is currently selling a smart-card of the type we have des- 
cribed, though one may be available at some time in the future. (In the meantime, the 
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capabilities listed above exist in portable computers, which could serve as bulky 
smart-card substitutes.) More realistic protocols that place weaker demands on 
smart-cards should therefore be considered. Various compatible solutions can be 
implemented with reduced degrees of security and user convenience. The protocols 
are subtler, as they rely on more complex trust relations between the principals (users, 
hosts, services) in the system. 
Consider, for example, a smart-card with no clock. Such a smart-card is attractive 
because it avoids the need for a battery. Unfortunately, the smart-card can no longer 
generate timestamps for its certificates, and it cannot check that other certificates have 
not expired. A variety of replay attacks becomes possible, unless the card can obtain 
the time somehow. To counter replay attacks effectively, the card may obtain the time 
from a network time service, which must then be secure and trusted. 
In this paper, we describe a range of public-key smart-card authentication proto- 
cols, with different compromises between cost and security. The protocols were 
developed in the context of the Digital Distributed System Security Architecture [S]. 
Most previous work focuses on user authentication using shared-key cryptography, 
with little discussion of delegation (see, e.g., [S]). We believe that public-key crypto- 
graphy is more suitable than shared-key cryptography for authentication and delega- 
tion, and that it is not prohibitively expensive when used wisely. The protocols 
considered can be based on RSA encryption [15], but other algorithms (e.g., [9]) 
could also be used. 
We analyze the protocols with a logic of authentication. This is essentially the logic 
of Burrows, Abadi and Needham [3], with a simple extension to handle secure and 
timely channels. It should be noted that our logical account is not the only one 
possible, and that alternative logical frameworks could be used (see the appendix). 
Despite its shortcomings, the formalism enables us to describe the assumptions and 
the guarantees of each protocol, clarifying the trust relations between principals. 
Moreover, a logical account helps in avoiding certain security flaws commonly 
present in authentication protocols [3]. 
In the next section, we summarize the notation of the logic: the logic is discussed 
further in an appendix. In later sections, we describe smart-card authentication 
protocols, starting with those that require the more ambitious smart-card designs and 
the weaker trust relations. We analyze three cases in some detail; the reader can 
interpolate between these. The informal descriptions (without the logic) are self- 
contained, and the formal passages may be skipped in a first reading. 
2. Notation 
In the analysis of smart-card protocols, we apply a logic for describing the beliefs of 
the principals in the course of authentication. Several sorts of objects appear in the 
logic: principals, encryption keys, formulas, and communication links. (The original 
logic does not discuss links.) In what follows, the symbols P,Q, and R range over 
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principals; X and Y range over formulas; K ranges over encryption keys; L ranges 
over communication links. The constructs that we use are listed below. 
P believes X. 
P controls X: P has jurisdiction over X. The principal P is an authority on X and 
should be trusted on this matter. For example, a certification authority may be 
trusted to provide the public keys of principals. 
P said X: P once said X. The principal P sent a message including X, either long ago 
or during the current run of the protocol. In any case, P believed X when he sent the 
message. 
P said, X: P once said X on L. 
P sees X: P sees X. A message containing X has been sent to P, who can read and 
repeat X (possibly after doing some decryption). 
P seesL X: P sees X on L. 
fresh(X): X is fresh, i.e., X has not been sent in a message at any time before 
the current run of the protocol. This usually holds for timestamps and for 
noncesexpressions invented for the purpose of being fresh. 
timely(l): The link L is a timely channel: all messages on L are known to have been 
sent recently. 
t%P: P has K as a public key. The matching secret key (the inverse of K, denoted 
K - ‘) will never be discovered by any principal except P, or a principal trusted by P. 
*P: The link L is a secure channel from P: all messages on L are known to have 
been sent by P, or a principal trusted by P. 
P 5 Q: X is a secret that will never be known to anyone but P and Q, and possibly 
to principals trusted by them. Only P-and Q may use X to prove their identities to 
one another. An example of a shared secret is a password or a PIN. 
{X),: This represents the formula X encrypted under the key K. 
(X),: This represents X combined with the formula Y; it is intended that Y be 
a secret, and that its presence prove the identity of whoever utters (X),. In 
implementations, X may simply be concatenated with Y; our notation highlights 
that Y plays a special role, as proof of origin for X. 
P + Q: X: This represents a protocol step where P sends X to Q. 
P + Q:X on L: This represents a protocol step where P sends X to Q on L. 
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3. A protocol for ideal smart-cards 
We start with a description of how user authentication would work given the 
ultimate smart-card, with its own keyboard, display, clock, and logic for performing 
public-key encryption. Other schemes are best thought of in terms of their differences 
from this scheme. 
We assume that a distributed name service is available. The name service contains 
certijicates with information about which nodes each user should trust and which 
public keys belong to which agents. A certificate is a statement that has been signed by 
a principal. Often, certificates are signed by a widely trusted service, known as 
a certijcation authority. A certificate typically includes a timestamp, with its time of 
issue, and sometimes an explicit lifetime, which limits its validity. The certification 
authority need not be on-line; the name service need not be trusted. 
We also assume that principals know the time accurately enough to check the 
validity of certificates and to detect the replay of timestamped messages. A trusted 
time service is one way of achieving this. 
We first describe the protocol informally, and then more formally. 
3.1. Discussion 
For the sake of concreteness, let us imagine that a user wants to prove his identity to 
a workstation. Moreover, the user wishes to allow the workstation to access files on 
his behalf. 
(1) The user sits down at the workstation and presents his smart-card. The smart- 
card is willing to give certain information, including the name of the user, to 
anyone. 
(2) The workstation now authenticates itself to the smart-card. Given the name of 
the user, the workstation can retrieve all the certificates the smart-card needs to 
determine that it is allowed to delegate authority to the workstation; it forwards 
these to the smart-card. The workstation also generates a new public key and 
a matching secret key; we refer to these keys as delegation keys. It sends the 
public key and a timestamp to the smart-card, signed with its own secret key. 
(3) The smart-card examines the information presented by the workstation, verify- 
ing the signatures and lifetimes on all of the certificates. At this point, the 
smart-card knows the public key of the workstation and that the workstation 
can be trusted to act on behalf of the user. The smart-card shows that it is 
satisfied on its display and requests the user’s PIN. In addition, it might give the 
identity of the workstation, or at least an indication, such as a group nickname. 
It might also provide some means to identify the workstation’s display, such as 
a name or location. 
(4) Now the user has some evidence of the workstation’s identity. The user re- 
sponds by entering a PIN into the keyboard of the smart-card, thus authorizing 
the use of this workstation. 
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(5) The entry of the correct PIN indicates that the genuine user is present, rather 
than some smart-card thief. Hence, the card constructs and signs a delegation 
certijicate. This delegation certificate authorizes anyone who can demonstrate 
knowledge of the secret delegation key to act on behalf of the user for a limited 
period of time. It sends that certificate to the workstation. 
(6) The workstation verifies that the delegation certificate is signed with the card’s 
secret key and contains the public delegation key. At this point, the workstation 
has authenticated the user, in the sense that it knows that whoever is at the 
keyboard has a particular public key. The workstation has enough information 
to consult an access control list and to determine whether it should provide its 
services to this user. Moreover, the delegation certificate enables the worksta- 
tion to convince another node, such as a file server, that the workstation acts on 
behalf of the user. 
This completes the authentication process. The workstation now knows the user’s 
identity. It can prove that it acts on the user’s behalf by presenting the delegation 
certificate and proving that it knows the secret delegation key. The user also knows 
something about the workstation-perhaps its name, but at least that the workstation 
can be trusted, according to the certification authority. 
For authentication, it does not suffice for the user and the workstation to know 
each other’s names. They must also know that they are communicating via a particu- 
lar keyboard and a particular display, and for example that no malicious principal is 
interposed between the user and the workstation. An implementation of this protocol 
should provide this guarantee. 
An important variation on this scheme has to do with roles. A user may need and 
want different privileges when he acts as member of a research group and as manager, 
for example. A user may also want different privileges depending on his trust of the 
systems that act on his behalf. Software and hardware trusted in one role should be 
prevented from gaining privileges reserved for another role. One way of providing this 
capability is to issue multiple smart-cards to the user, one for each role. A more 
satisfactory solution is to have a single smart-card support multiple roles. By typing at 
the card’s keyboard, the user could select a role, to be mentioned in the delegation 
certificate. In addition, the smart-card could restrict the roles available, to save the 
user from misplaced trust in unsafe environments. 
For the purposes of a logical analysis, it would be adequate to conceive of the user 
in each of his roles as a different user. For simplicity, we do not discuss roles further in 
this paper. 
3.2. Notation and assumptions 
The notation used in the remainder of this section is as follows: 
l S is the certification authority, W the workstation, C the smart-card, U the user, and 
F a file server (or any other node) that the workstation contacts on behalf of the user; 
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l K,, K,, and K, are the public keys of S, W, and C, respectively; 
l Kd is the public delegation key, generated by W; 
l PIN is U’s personal identification number; 
l T,, T,, T,, TI, and Tr are timestamps; 
l I, is the smart-card’s keyboard (input to the card); 
l 0, is the smart-card’s display (output from the card); 
l I, is the workstation’s keyboard (input to the workstation); and 
l 0, is the workstation’s display (output from the workstation). 
The name C is useful only in connecting U with K,, and need not be present in an 
implementation. Similarly, the names for I, and 0, will quite likely be related to one 
another, and to W. For example, if I, and 0, are referred to by location, then the 
names could be identical. 
In order to analyze the protocol with the logic, we have to state its assumptions and 
describe it more formally. We leave the description of the protocol to the next 
subsection, and now proceed to discuss its assumptions. The assumptions naturally 
fall into several classes: 
Assumptions about timestamps 
The smart-card, the workstation, and the file server believe that certain timestamps 
were generated recently: 
(1) C believes fresh( T,), C believes fresh( T;), C believes fresh( T,); 
(2) W believes fresh( T,), W believes fresh( Ti); 
(3) F believes fresh(c), F believes fresh(Ty). 
Assumptions about keys and secrets 
(1) S believes z C, S believes 2 W: the certification authority believes the smart- 
card’s public key is K,, and the workstation’s public key is K,; 
(2) C believes ?+ S: the smart-card believes the certification authority’s public key 
is K,; 
PIN 
(3) C believes C _ - U: the smart-card believes that PIN is a secret shared with the 
user; 
(4) Wbelieves k S: the workstation believes the certification authority’s public key 
is K,; 
(5) W believes z U: the workstation believes that Kd is a good key for U (prob- 
ably because W has constructed the key); 
(6) F believes ?+ S: the file server believes the certification authority’s public key 
is K,. 
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Assumptions about channels 
(1) W believes 2 W: the workstation believes that the display is a secure channel 
from it; 
(2) U believes 2 C, U believes timely(0,): the user believes that the smart-card’s 
display is a secure and timely channel from the smart-card; 
(3) U believes 2 U: the user believes that the workstation’s keyboard is a secure 
channel from him; 
(4) C believes timely(1,): the smart-card believes that its keypad is a timely channel. 
Assumptions about trust 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
U believes VK.( W controls f+ U): the user believes that the workstation can 
choose an appropriate public key; intuitively, the user is willing to delegate to 
this workstation; 
S believes U controls VK.( W controls t% U): W is believed to be a safe 
workstation for the user to delegate to; more precisely, the certification authority 
trusts the user to decide whether to trust this workstation in the choice of a key; 
S believes VX.(C controls U believes X): the certification authority trusts the 
smart-card to relay the user’s beliefs; 
S believes VK.(C controls t% U): the certification authority trusts the smart- 
card to set a key for the user; 
U believes Wcontrols 2 W: the user trusts the workstation when it says that the 
display 0, is a channel from it; 
U believes V W. (C controls W believes 7 W): the user trusts his card to pass on 
beliefs of the workstation; 
W believes U controls ‘2 U: the workstation trusts the user when he claims to be 
at the keyboard. 
In addition, there are a few assumptions about trust in the server; for the sake of 
brevity, we assume that every principal trusts the server completely. 
Some of the assumptions are rather strong, and could be weakened. In particular, 
the assumption 
W believes U controls’< U 
is a simplification of the more accurate “the workstation trusts whoever claims to be 
at its keyboard to identify himself properly through the smart-card”. Our simple logic 
is unable to express this satisfactorily in a single formula. 
3.3. The protocol analyzed 
Now we discuss the protocol in detail, and show that it establishes channels (the 
keyboard and the display) between the user and the workstation, and that it provides 
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a delegation key that the workstation can use on behalf of the user in dealing with 
other nodes: 
U believes “? W, W believes ‘2 U , F believes 2 U. 
Step by step, we can follow the evolution of the beliefs of the participants, from the 
initial assumptions to these conclusions. We summarize the major deductions, and at 
the same time we explain the messages in the protocol. 
The reasoning deals with an idealized version of the protocol, in which messages 
are replaced by formulas of the logic. These formulas should be believed by the 
principals that send them. An implementation of the protocol need not transmit these 
formulas literally; any unambiguous bit representation will do, and one is typically 
obvious from the context. We suggest one possible implementation in the next 
subsection. 
The transmission of certificates is represented explicitly. We do not show the exact 
routes these follow, however, as the routes do not affect the properties of the 
protocol&they are merely an implementation choice. In practice, one would expect 
certificates to be cached, so that they do not need to be transmitted or checked 
repeatedly. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
W + C: {I% U, 2 W, 7’.‘.)K,l . The workstation asserts that it has a public key 
K, for the user and that the display 0, is a secure channel from W. 
S + C: { f% W, Ts}Ks-~ , {U controls VK.( W controls f+ U), T:},-I . The certi- 
fication authority provides the public key of the workstation to the 
smart-card. At this point, the smart-card can decrypt and attribute the 
previous message, as well as check the freshness of the timestamp T,. The 
certification authority also states that the user can let this workstation choose 
a delegation key. The smart-card trusts the certification authority; in the logic, 
we obtain 
C believes fk W, C believes U controls VK.( W controls t% U) 
and then also 
C believes W believes ‘< W. 
C + U: W believes “? W on 0,. On its display, the card provides the name of 
the workstation to the user; the card also gives enough information for the user 
to check whether the display in front of him is w’s. More precisely, the 
smart-card states that W believes that 0, is its display (formally, that 0, is 
a secure channel from W). Since the user trusts the smart-card on this matter 
and it knows that the smart-card’s display is both secure and timely, it believes 
the card’s assertion. We can now derive: 
U believes ‘2 W, 
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because the user trusts W on 2 W. Thus, the workstation has authenticated 
itself to the user. 
(4) U + C: (VK.( Wcontrols t5 U), 2 LQPIN olt I,. If the user wishes to proceed, 
he enters his PIN on the card’s keypad. Thus, the user indicates that 
he trusts the workstation to choose a key and that he is at the keyboard 
I,. He uses his PIN to convince the smart-card of his identity. We can 
prove: 
C believes V’K.( W controls t% U) , C believes U believes I< U. 
Using s’s certificates and w’s claims, we can also obtain 
C believes z U. 
(5) C-+W:{UbI Iw e ieves i U, 7’,‘,}K;~. The smart-card communicates to the work- 
station that the user believes he is at the keyboard. In an implementation where 
U and I, are clear from context, it suffices for C to send a signed message to W, 
such as the delegation certificate below. 
(6) S + W: { k C, VX.(C controls U believes X), T~},;I. The certification 
authority gives the smart-card’s public key to the workstation, and connects 
this key to U. At this point, the workstation can decrypt the previous message 
and check its timestamp. With a few applications of the logical postulates, we 
prove 
W believes ‘2 U. 
This statement means that the workstation believes that the user is at 
its keyboard, and hence that the user has authenticated himself to the work- 
station. 
(7) C * F: { z U, T,}K,~. The smart-card certifies that K, is a delegation key 
for the user. 
(8) S + F: { z C, VK.(C controls f+ U), T:‘},;I. The certification authority gives 
the smart-card’s key to the file server. At this point, the file server can decrypt 
the certificate from the smart-card and check the timestamp in it. Furthermore, 
the certification authority asserts that the card can set a key for the user, and the 
file server trusts the certification authority in this matter as well. Hence, we 
obtain 
F believes z U. 
Informally, the file server has accepted the delegation key generated by the 
workstation, and thus the workstation can act on the user’s behalf. 
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After this message sequence, the file server F has not heard about W. All the 
responsibility for checking the suitability of Wrests on the user and the smart-card. 
This is not entirely unreasonable, as we are assuming a powerful smart-card. In the 
next section, we describe protocols where F participates in this checking. 
3.4. A concrete implementation 
Here we suggest one concrete implementation of the protocol just described. For 
this, we rely on the informal notation typical in the literature. In particular we omit 
details such as packet-type fields, needed to distinguish messages with similar formats 
but different meanings. Most of the steps are rather obvious. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
C -+ W: U. The card provides the user’s name. Security does not depend on this 
message, and hence there is no corresponding message in the idealized protocol. 
W+ C: (I&, U, W, 7”}K,~, {K,, W, Ts}Kc~, { W, U, T:},;I. The workstation 
provides a delegation key, as in the idealized protocol. It also presents the 
credentials signed by S, which certify IV’s public key and its suitability for U. 
This message is a combination of messages (1) and (2) of the idealized protocol. 
C + U: W. The card displays the workstation’s name to the user. This message 
corresponds to message (3) of the idealized protocol. 
U + C: PIN. The user types his PIN to signify his approval. This message 
corresponds to message (4). 
C + W: {Kdr U, Tc}KL~, {K,, C, U, T~},;I. The card creates a certificate attest- 
ing that Kd is a good delegation key for U. It gives this certificate to W, along 
with a certificate from S that shows that the card belongs to U and has key K,. 
This message is a combination of messages (5) and (6) of the idealized protocol. 
W+ F: (Kd, U, T’,}Kc~, (K,, C, U, T~},;I. The certificates from C are passed 
on to F. This message is a combination of messages (7) and (8). 
We derived this concrete implementation from the idealized form. Much of the 
process consisted of removing logical connectives from messages, for example replacing 
with 
{K,, w, %;I. 
We also added the first message as a hint and changed various routes. A similar process 
would yield concrete forms for the protocols described in the following sections. 
4. A more realistic smart-card protocol 
The smart-card design required for the protocol of the previous section is rather 
ambitious with today’s technology. In this section, we consider a protocol that 
requires much less from the smart-card. Another one appears in the next section. 
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4.1. Concessions in smart-card design 
The first feature to eliminate is the clock on the card. Having a clock on the card is 
difficult because it requires a battery. The clock could be eliminated by having the user 
enter the time; it is equivalent, but much more practical, to have the workstation 
supply the time to the card and the user verify it on the display. This solution is not as 
convenient or as secure (the user will probably not check very carefully), but it works. 
There are two threats if the smart-card has an incorrect notion of time. First, the card 
could be tricked into signing a delegation certificate for some time far in the future and 
the workstation could then impersonate the user without the smart-card being 
physically present. Second, a workstation whose certificate has expired at some time 
in the past could convince the smart-card the certificate is still valid. 
Another feature we could eliminate is the keyboard on the card. It may be quite 
difficult to make a small, mechanically strong keyboard that can be reached even 
when the card has been connected to a reader. The user could instead enter his PIN on 
the workstation’s keyboard, which could forward the PIN in a message to the card. 
The danger here, though not a particularly worrisome one, is that a misbehaving 
workstation could capture the PIN. The workstation could give the PIN to someone 
who subsequently steals the card, or the workstation could use the PIN more than 
once on a single insertion of the card to obtain the delegation of more roles than the 
user intended. These threats can be avoided entirely by having the card display 
a nonce secret and having the user “modify” it into the PIN with a series of “+” and 
“nextdigit” operations sent via the workstation keyboard. We can view this nonce 
secret as an encryption key (or a one-time pad) that the card supplies to the user to 
establish a secure channel that the workstation cannot read or write. In this way, PIN 
entry goes through the keyboard but is not subject to replay. 
A similar concession is to remove the display from the card, instead of the 
keyboard. In this case, it is straightforward for the user to enter the PIN, but it is much 
harder for the smart-card to identify the workstation to the user. A single LED is 
a partial substitute for a display. 
A final compromise consists in limiting the smart-card’s ability to encrypt and 
decrypt. We consider the extreme case where the smart-card signs one message but is 
not able to decrypt. In this case, it is desirable to provide a secure channel from the 
workstation (such as a secure card reader). 
In the remainder of this section, we study a protocol where the smart-card has 
a display, but has neither a clock nor a keyboard, and has reduced encryption 
capabilities. (We leave to the reader the derivation and analysis of variants.) 
These concessions in smart-card design may leave the user at the mercy of the 
workstation. It is therefore desirable to transfer some trust from the workstation to 
other principals in the distributed environment. 
The simplest choice is to give a more prominent role to the principals that check 
delegation certificates, such as the file server F. Thus, F takes into account w’s 
identity before accepting a delegation key for U. Moreover, F may grant some 
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requests from W on behalf of U, and not others (as in the general approach to 
delegation of [1,10,12]). The user obtains no real guarantee of the identity of the 
workstation, since the card cannot decrypt. However, the user can be sure that his 
authority is not delegated inappropriately, because of the check performed by F. This 
is the approach we adopt in the following protocol. 
In the next section, we discuss a more elaborate design, where dedicated trusted 
agents assist the smart-card in the process of delegation. 
4.2. Notation and assumptions 
Some additional notation is needed: 
K,, is a short secret nonce generated by the card, to protect the entry of the user’s 
PIN-as the notation suggests, we view the secret as an encryption key for the 
PIN; 
L, is the smart-card reader; and 
{ Tb}K,~ is a timestamp signed by B, a trusted time service; B is trusted never to 
sign a timestamp for a time in the future: W obtains the certified timestamp by 
whatever means, and may check T,. 
The following are the main novelties in the initial assumptions; we omit a full list. In 
these, it is convenient to use the name IV’ for the workstation that controls the channel 
L,. (With any luck, of course, w’ is the intended IV.) We need this notation because the 
user must reason about the workstation connected to L, before believing it is W. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
C believes 2 w’, C believes timely(L,): the smart-card believes that the smart- 
card reader provides a timely, secure channel to the workstation IV’; 
C believes C “z U, C believes fresh(C Kcu ++U): the smart-card has a secret, to be 
used to hide the PIN from the workstation; this secret is a nonce and, hence, its 
mention in a message proves the freshness of this message. 
U believes w’ controls? W: the user trusts the workstation connected to the 
smart-card reader to give its name correctly, asserting that the display is a secure 
channel from W-the user may reject outrageous names, though: this assumption 
is strong, since the user gets no real guarantee of the workstation’s identity; 
(4) F believes fresh( { Tb}K, I): the file server believes in the timeliness of the certified 
timestamp; B’s signature convinces F of the validity of T,, even though C does 
not have a clock, because B is trusted not to sign future timestamps. 
4.3. The protocol analyzed 
The protocol presented here achieves the same properties as the one for ultimate 
smart-cards, namely, 
U believes? W, W believes ‘; U, F believes z U. 
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This amounts to mutual authentication and delegation. However, stronger assump- 
tions are required here, particularly for the first conclusion. 
The messages and the deductions can be explained thus: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
W + C: “;: W on L, . The workstation names itself and its display. 
0, KC” 
C-+U: W’believes< W,CoUonO,. This card passes the workstation’s 
message on to the user. It also provides a one-time pad K,,. Note that the user 
has no assurance that the named workstation is actually the workstation in 
front of him. However, he can be sure that he is delegating authority only to the 
machine named. The user simply trusts the workstation to give its name 
correctly. Thus, we have 
U believes? W. 
u+c: ~z~U,VK.(Wco”trols~u),C 
KG” 
++ UlKcu. The user enters his PIN. 
The PIN is not entered directly; instead, the user types a sequence of keys which 
modify the displayed value K,, until the PIN is displayed. Thus, the user asserts 
that he is at the keyboard, and gives jurisdiction to the workstation over the 
choice of a key. The key K,, appears inside the message as proof of timeliness. 
(In an implementation, the use of K,, as a one-time pad suffices as proof of 
timeliness.) 
C+ W: {Ubelieves’< U,(T’,)Kb~}KF~.A s in the previous protocol, the smart- 
card communicates to the workstation that the user believes he is at the 
keyboard. The certified timestamp, which may have been obtained via W, is 
included as proof of timeliness. 
S -+ W: { =f, C, VX.(C controls U believes X), Ty}Ks-~. The certification 
authority provides the smart-card’s public key to the workstation and certifies 
that the smart-card is allowed to transmit the user’s beliefs. At this point the 
workstation can interpret the previous message. As in the previous protocol, the 
user has authenticated to the workstation: 
W believes’? U. 
C -+ F: {U believes W controls z U, { Tb}K,~}K,~. In this delegation certifi- 
cate, the smart-card asserts that the user has delegated to the workstation: 
it says that the user believes that the workstation has jurisdiction over 
setting Kd as his delegation key. The certificate includes { Tb}K,~ as proof of 
timeliness. 
W+ F: { 2 U, { Tb}Kb~}K,~. The workstation asserts that Kd is a delegation 
key for U. 
S+F: {k W,T,},;l, {VK.(U controls Wcontrols& U), T:}K;~, 
{ z C, VX.(C controls U believes X), T~},;I. The certification authority 
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provides the public keys of the smart-card and the workstation. It certifies that 
the user can delegate to this workstation, and that the smart-card is allowed to 
transmit the user’s beliefs. Using the previous messages, we obtain the desired 
delegation result: 
F believes tf% U. 
It is not strictly necessary to include the key Kd in the delegation certificate, as we 
have. However, the mention of the key makes it simple for the workstation to 
renounce delegated powers when they are no longer needed, by forgetting the 
matching secret key K; ‘. Thus, the user is protected against future compromise of the 
workstation, even if the delegation certificate has a long lifetime. 
As usual, the number of messages can be reduced by caching commonly used 
certificates. Furthermore, the smart-card need perform only one signing operation, 
and this can be done while the user enters his PIN. Hence the card need not be 
particularly fast. The total complexity of the protocol has increased slightly, but the 
demands on the smart-card have decreased. This protocol, or similar ones, may well 
be practical. 
5. A protocol with trusted agents 
An alternative approach to reducing the demands on the smart-card is based on the 
use of trusted agents. We discuss this solution here. 
5.1. Trusted agents 
An on-line trusted agent can relieve the smart-card from the elaborate rituals 
of generating timestamps and verifying certificates. As this trusted agent can 
check that W is a suitable workstation for U, this burden is removed from principals 
such as F. Moreover, a trusted agent simplifies the process of revocation 
for a compromised workstation-a trusted agent may be a convenient place for 
a workstation black list. The workstation and the trusted agents can check on one 
another. 
As we envision them, these trusted agents are dedicated, physically protected 
machines. There would be a large number of trusted agents widely dispersed. Each 
trusted agent assists a community of users under a single domain or management. Any 
such arrangement reduces availability (when all replicas are down or inaccessible, the 
user cannot work) and lessens security (since the agents are an attractive target for 
attacks). 
If the smart-card can execute only the DES algorithm [6], then the trusted agent 
will get access to the user’s private key during the login process. It can still be arranged 
that compromise of a trusted agent will not permit the impersonation of all users who 
trust it-only of those who use it while it is compromised. 
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If the smart-card can perform the RSA signing operation, a protocol can be 
obtained whereby the trusted agent cannot impersonate the user. The compromise of 
a trusted agent does not destroy security per se. In the solution explored in the rest of 
this section, the smart-card will sign anything the workstation gives it, but no one will 
believe anything signed by the smart-card without a certificate from a suitable trusted 
agent. As in the previous protocol, the user obtains no real guarantee of the identity of 
the workstation, since the card cannot decrypt. However, the user can be sure that his 
authority is not delegated inappropriately, because of the check performed by the 
trusted agent. 
5.2. Notation and assumptions 
Let A be a trusted agent, K, his public key, and T, a timestamp he generates. 
The most important new assumptions are: 
(1) S believes VKV W.(A controls W believes f+ U), 
S believes VKV W.(A controls U controls W controls I% U): the certification 
authority believes that the user is in the domain of the trusted agent A; the 
formulas represent consequences of this belief. 
(2) A believes VK.(U controls W controls t% U): the trusted agent A believes that 
U can delegate to W. 
We trust A as different from B, the trrusted time provider, although A and B could 
obviously be implemented by a single node. 
5.3. The protocol analyzed 
Many of the messages are identical to those of the previous protocol. We discuss 
only the changes. 
(1) W+ A: { 2 U,Tw}K;~. The workstation asserts that Kd is a delegation key 
for U. 
(2) S+A: {“; W,Ts}K;l. The trusted agent consults a certificate that contains 
IV’s key. 
(3) W--+C: “? WonL,. 
(4) C+ U: w’believes’f W, C”ZU on 0,. 
(5) U+C: {?U,VK.(Wcontrolsf+ U),C2U},_. 
(6) C-+ W: {U believes; U, (Tb}Kb~}K;~. 
(7) A + F: (W believes z U, U controls W controls 2 U, q}K,~. The trusted 
agent checks that the workstation is a reasonable machine for the user to trust. 
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It signs a certificate to that effect, including the delegation key for the sub- 
sequent session. The trusted agent states that W has chosen &, and that U can 
let W use K, as a delegation key. 
(8) C -+ F: {U believes W controls “;: U, { Tb}Kbl}KF~. The file server checks that 
values of U and Wmatch those in the previous message. This check ensures that 
both the user and the trusted agent refer to the same workstation. 
(9) s + F: { 2 A, Ti},;l, 
{V’KV W.(A controls W believes f+ U), 
VKV W.(A controls U controls W controls f+ U), T~},;I, 
{ ifb C, VX.(C controls U believes X), Ty’}KS-~. The file server obtains certific- 
ates for A and C. 
The result is the usual one: mutual authentication and delegation. 
6. Conclusions 
Authentication protocols that use smart-cards are a significant improvement 
over those that use simple passwords. We have described a few smart-card protocols 
and the guarantees they offer. We feel that the use of a formalism has helped 
us elucidate and compare some of the subtle trust relations that underlie these 
protocols. 
A trade-off is inevitable, between the trust that the user needs to place in the 
environment, and the power, cost, and size of his smart-card. Each of the proto- 
cols-and there are others-has its own problems and addresses specific threats, with 
specific technological requirements. 
Appendix A. The logic 
In the analysis of smart-card protocols, we apply a logic of authentication. The 
notation is as given in Section 2; here we give a few of the main rules of inference and 
briefly explain how to use them. 
The logic is presented in [3]. It is discussed further in [2], which proposes 
a variant of the logic and defines a Kripke semantics. That variant could be 
extended with constructs for links and then the analysis of the smart-card 
protocols could be translated; the new analysis would differ from the one given 
above in many uninteresting details. Yet another possible formalism would incor- 
porate aspects of the logic of [1,12]; this logic considers links but not other 
important notions, such as time. We chose the logic of [3] because it was mature 
enough when this work was started, and adequate for the task of clarifying authentica- 
tion protocols. 
110 M. Abadi et al 
A.I. Rules of inference 
We manipulate formulas of the logic with rules of inference, such as the 
following. 
l The jurisdiction rule reflects that if P believes that Q is an authority on X then 
P trusts Q on the truth of X: 
P believes Q controls X, P believes Q believes X 
P believes X 
l The public-key message-meaning rule concerns the interpretation of encrypted 
messages: 
P believes F% Q, P sees {x},- 1 
P believes Q said X ’ 
That is, if P believes that the key K is Q’s public key and P sees X encrypted 
under K’s inverse, then P believes that Q once said X. 
l A similar message-meaning rule applies to links: 
P believes 4 Q, P seesL X 
P believes Q saidL X ’ 
l A nonce-verification rule expresses the check that a part of a message is recent, 
and hence that the sender still believes in the message: 
P believes fresh(X), P believes Q said X 
P believes Q believes X 
That is, if P believes that X could have been uttered only recently and that Q once 
said X, then P believes that Q has said X recently, and hence that Q believes X. 
A variant of this rule is sometimes useful: 
P believes fresh(Y), P believes Q said (X, Y) 
P believes Q believes X 
For the sake of simplicity, we use this rule only when X is cleartext, that is, it has 
no subformulas of the form { Y},. A similar remark applies to all other rules that 
introduce the believes operator. 
l Another way to guarantee timeliness is by using timely communication links: 
P believes timely(L), P believes Q said, X 
P believes Q believes X 
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A.2. On quant$ers in delegations 
Delegation statements usually mention one or more variables. For example, the 
user U may let the workstation W generate an arbitrary delegation key. We can 
express this as 
U believes W controls A U . 
Here the key K is universally quantified, and we can make explicit this quantification 
by writing 
U believes V K. ( W controls ?+ U) 
For complex delegation statements, it is generally necessary to write quantifiers 
explicitly in order to avoid ambiguities. In some previous works on the logic, this need 
was not recognized, as in fact it did not arise. (There were no nested jurisdiction 
statements.) This need does arise in the proofs above. 
Our formal manipulation of quantifiers is quite straightforward. All we use is the 
ability to instantiate variables in jurisdiction statements, as reflected by the rule 
P believes V VI . . . V,. (Q controls X) 
P believes Q’ controls X’ ’ 
where Q’ controls X’ is the result of simultaneously instantiating all of the variables 
V 1, ... , V, in Q controls X. 
Since this is the only rule needed, all quantifiers can be replaced with conjunctions, 
at the cost of conciseness. Each jurisdiction statement with quantifiers can be replaced 
with the conjunction of all its instances of interest. 
A.3. Protocol analysis 
Authentication protocols are typically described by listing their messages in the 
form 
P + Q : message. 
This denotes that P sends the message to Q. Occasionally, it is stated that the message 
follows a particular route, such as a secure channel. 
The message is presented in an informal notation designed to suggest he bit- 
string that a particular concrete implementation would use. In the interest of 
formal analysis, we rewrite each message as a logical formula. For instance, the 
protocol step 
A+ F:K, on link L1 
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may tell F, who knows that L1 is a secure channel from A, that K, is A’s public key. 
This step should then be idealized as 
A+F:~AonL,. 
We annotate idealized protocols with logical formulas, much as in a proof in Hoare 
logic [ll]. We write formulas before the first message and after each message. The 
main rules for deriving legal annotations are: 
l if X holds before the message P + Q: Y then both X and Q sees Y hold 
afterwards; 
l if X holds before the message P + Q: Y on L then both X and Q seesL Y hold 
afterwards; 
l if Y can be derived from X by the logical postulates then Y holds whenever 
X holds. 
An annotation of a protocol is like a sequence of comments about the beliefs of 
principals and what they see in the course of authentication, from initial assumptions 
to conclusions. 
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